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Chapter 8

When Climate Adaptation
Is Imperative yet Elusive:
Guatemala’s Test for
Climate Justice
Patricia G. Ferreira
The injustice of the whole issue of global warming and climate change lies
in the fact that t hose who have contributed nothing to its genesis w
 ill suffer the most from its consequences, because they have the least capacity to
adapt to t hese changes.
—Meles Zenawi, Former Prime Minister of Ethiopia
International discussions on climate justice legitimately emphasize the existential risk that extreme weather events and other natural effects associated
with global warming pose to the small island developing states in the Carib
bean Sea, the Pacific Ocean, and the Atlantic Ocean, and to the group of least
developed countries. In early September 2017, historic category 5 Hurricane
Irma illustrated this reality when it left three people dead and destroyed
95 percent of all the buildings in the Caribbean Barbuda, rendering the small
island completely uninhabitable for the first time after 300 years of human
settlement t here (Cockburn 2017). Less visible is the situation of a large number of the socially and economically vulnerable communities in lower middle
income developing countries such as Guatemala, to whom climate change
poses an equally existential threat, adding to the already existing development
challenges discussed in this volume.
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Guatemala perfectly illustrates the climate justice paradox: the countries that
contributed least to climate change, and have lower financial and technological
capacity to implement timely climate action, are often among the most vulnerable to climate impacts. Guatemala has barely contributed to greenhouse gas
emissions (GhGs) that cause climate change. Yet the country is suffering from
the effects of climate change. In 2005, Tropical Storm Stan caused more than
1,400 deaths, and over one half million affected in Guatemala, 70 percent of
whom w
 ere indigenous p
 eoples, causing U.S. $989 million in economic losses.
In 2010, tropical storms Alex, Agatha, Frank, and Matthew killed 262 Guatemalans, injured 778, required the evacuation of 243,000 homes, and left another
76,000 homes damaged. Estimates are that 723,000 p
 eople w
 ere affected in the
country, and the economic damage was U.S. $1 billion only for Agatha (Bosque
2011). Guatemala’s Homeland Security Unit for Disaster Reduction reported
that in 2015 almost one million Guatemalans w
 ere affected by floods and
landslides resulting from tropical storms, with 290 fatalities (República de Guatemala 2015a). In 2016, the Dry Corridor in Central America—affecting Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador—experienced a severe drought that left 1.5
million Guatemalans in need of humanitarian assistance (FAO 2016).
Global warming is expected to continue to intensify extreme weather
events, droughts, and floods, risking the livelihoods of millions of Guatemalans. This chapter examines the policy challenges climate change poses to
Guatemala and other lower middle-income countries like Guatemala, which
contributed very little to the problem, have low financial capacity to address
the costs of tackling climate effects, and yet have large shares of their population highly vulnerable to climate impacts. A key strategy for these countries
must be to prioritize climate adaptation over climate mitigation, and to get
access to sufficient international funds to finance the climate action needed.
In 2017, Guatemala is still not fully invested in this strategy. This chapter discusses a political obstacle at the national level and a structural challenge at the
international level that are preventing Guatemala from facing the imperative
need to prioritize climate adaptation.

I. Guatemala’s Climate Change Profile
Parties to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC)1 embraced the principle of common but differentiated
1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, 31 I.L.M. 849.

Chapter 8 · When Climate Adaptation Is Imperative

135

responsibilities and respective capabilities in the climate regime, signaling
their understanding that although states have a common responsibility to
adopt actions to mitigate GhGs, and actions to adapt to the impacts of climate
change, each state’s individual commitments are to be differentiated according to their national circumstances. This differentiation aims to promote
international cooperation by guiding a fair allocation of the burdens and the
costs of climate action among unequal states. To be equitable, this allocation
is to be informed according to markers such as: states’ contributions to GhGs
that provoke climate change; states’ financial and technological capabilities
to adopt climate action; states’ levels of socioeconomic development; and
states’ vulnerabilities to climate change impacts (Rajamani 2006).
For a long time, the manifestation of differentiation in the climate regime
followed a rigid North-South divide, taking into account developed countries’
significant share of contributions to GhGs, their greater financial and technological capabilities to address the climate challenge, and developing countries’
need to prioritize actions to reduce poverty and to improve other indicators
of socioeconomic development (Ferreira 2016). Under the UNFCCC and the
1995 Kyoto Protocol, only developed countries w
 ere legally required to adopt
national mitigation policies demonstrating that they were taking the lead in
modifying long-term trends in GhGs emissions (UNFCCC, Art. 4.1 and Art.
4.2), while developing countries w
 ere to voluntarily adopt national mitigation
programs, especially if financially supported by developed countries (Rajamani 2006).
As developing countries’ share of global GhGs emissions grew over time,
especially due to the emissions of emerging economies like China and India
(Ferreira 2016),2 the need for urgent universal climate action became evident.
The Paris Agreement has strengthened the common nature of the responsibilities to adopt climate action, with all parties now mandated to formulate, to
communicate, and to update their nationally determined contributions
(NDCs) to address climate change.3 However, the content of the NDCs is not
legally binding, in that their implementation is voluntary. Instead of different
levels of binding obligations for all countries with significant emissions and
sufficient capabilities, all commitments became voluntary. The new paradigm

2. China and India are currently among the top four global emitters, although only
in absolute emissions, as their per capita emissions remain significantly lower than t hose
of developed countries.
3. Obligations of conduct when it comes to preparing and submitting nationally
determined contributions are now universal, and do not follow a North-South divide.
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is therefore one of self-determined differentiation, whereby each country shall
assess its own levels of emissions contributions, financial and technological
capabilities, as well as climate change vulnerabilities and development needs
(Rajamani 2016).
Developed countries as a group still have the exclusive obligation to provide
financial support for climate action in developing countries under the Paris
Agreement (Paris Agreement, Art. 9 2015). Yet, with the exception of the least
developed countries and small island developing states, which are assumed
to need international financial and technological support to cope with climate change impacts, all other developing countries are expected to present
self-financed pledges of climate action, based on their national circumstances, as
well as their needs for international financial assistance. Guatemala is not
among the list of least developed countries or small island developing states,
which have priority access to international support for climate action under
the climate regime of the UNFCCC. Yet, the national circumstances of Guatemala and other lower middle-income countries also deserve attention from a
climate justice perspective.

Low Contributions and Limited Capabilities
Guatemala’s GhGs emissions, although growing, have historically been
minor, and remain insignificant, as the country is responsible for less than
0.08 percent of total global emissions (Grantham Research Institute 2016).
Guatemala ranks in the bottom fifty countries (out of 197) in share of global
absolute emissions (WRI 2017). Guatemala’s per capita GhGs emissions are
below average even when compared to other lower middle income developing
countries (WRI 2017). Considering such low contributions, Guatemala does
not bear substantial responsibility for addressing the problem of climate
change without support from t hose countries responsible for significant emissions, particularly developed countries.
Guatemala also faces limited financial capacity and technological capacity
to address the climate change problem it has not created. Due primarily to
strong exports of commodities such as coffee, bananas, and sugar to the United
States, Guatemala has experienced strong economic growth since 2012, growth
above the average for Latin America (World Bank 2017). Guatemala is the largest economy in Central America, with an absolute Gross National Income
(GNI) higher than Costa Rica (World Bank 2017). These statistics may give
the misleading impression that Guatemala has sufficient financial capacity to
address climate change using its own financial resources. This is not the case
for various reasons.
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First, as the country with the largest population in Central America, Guatemala’s GNI per capita is significantly lower than most of its less populous
Central American neighbors. Guatemala still ranks 144th in global GNI per
capita (out of 216 countries). Second, Guatemala’s recent economic growth
starts from a low base, below the average of its neighbors, and the economy continues to be highly dependent on a few volatile natural commodities exports
to a single market, the United States. Guatemala’s export sectors are markedly
vulnerable to climate change impacts. Third, Guatemala’s government budget
to finance public policies is extremely limited. The country features the lowest
tax to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio in the Americas, at 12.4 percent,
and one of the world’s lowest. For comparison, neighboring Honduras collects
and spends 15.8 percent of GDP, Costa Rica 21.0 percent, Mexico 29.7 percent,
Argentina 32.1 percent, Canada 32.2 percent, and Cuba 38.6 percent. Finally,
Guatemala still ranks very low in technological innovation (98 out of 127 countries in a 2017 comparison of global innovation, below the average for Latin
America) (Dutta et al. 2017).

Guatemala’s High Vulnerability to Climate Impacts
In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth
Assessment Report defined vulnerability as the “degree to which a system is
susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change,
including climate variability and extremes” (IPCC 2007). Located in a narrow
strip of land sandwiched between the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea,
Guatemala is one of the world’s most environmentally vulnerable countries.
Guatemala’s territory is famously prone to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tropical storms, hurricanes, and droughts. Climate change is expected to intensify
the hurricanes, the floods by tropical storms, and the recurrent droughts in
Guatemala. In fact, all indications are that Guatemala is already experiencing
significant impacts from global warming (República de Guatemala 2015a).
The 2017 Global Climate Risk Index, which analyzes the quantified impacts
of extreme weather events worldwide (in terms of fatalities and economic
losses), ranked Guatemala among the ten countries most affected by extreme
weather events over the last twenty years (Kreft et al. 2017). Initial assessments
of climate change impacts, risks, and vulnerability focused chiefly on biophysical elements. Since 2007, however, the IPCC has explicitly recognized that
“climate change impacts depend on the characteristics of natural and human
systems, their development pathways and their specific locations” (IPCC
2007). The 2014 IPCC Fifth Assessment Report has unambiguously associated
climate vulnerabilities to societal risks and economic development pathways
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(IPCC 2014). The biophysical vulnerability of a country, dependent on its geo
graphical location, may be e ither minimized or compounded by economic
and social factors. Fluctuations in the economy, ecosystem degradation and
unsustainable use of natural resources, and possessing a high number of low-
income communities highly dependent on the natural environment for their
survival are all socioeconomic f actors that compound existing geophysical
vulnerabilities (IPCC 2014).
Other chapters of this book have illustrated how Guatemala still faces many
challenges to manage its natural resources in a sustainable manner—including
forests, water, minerals, and agriculture. By perpetuating unsustainable models of economic development, Guatemala magnifies its vulnerability to
climate impacts and risks. In addition, a significant share of Guatemala’s
population is socioeconomically vulnerable. Guatemala’s poverty levels remain
exceptionally high, particularly in rural zones and among indigenous communities. Official statistics show that a fter reducing from 56 percent to
51 percent between 2000 and 2006, poverty levels in Guatemala rose again to
59.3 percent of the population in 2014 (INE 2015). This increase in poverty
levels lies in contrast to most other Central American countries and Latin
American countries more generally, which have experienced significant reductions in poverty levels in the last decades. Poverty is particularly high among
Guatemala’s indigenous population, as 80 percent w
 ere living below the poverty line in 2014 (INE 2015).
In 2017, the World Food Program alerted that the prolonged droughts and
recurrent hurricanes, floods, and landslides that plagued Guatemala in recent
years were exacerbating the already fragile livelihoods of low-income Guatemalans, placing the country as one with the highest rates of chronic malnutrition in the world, at 47 percent of population (WFP 2017). The Guatemalan
state was already under the moral imperative to create programs and systems
to combat poverty and to improve the life conditions of its low-income communities. Climate change has added an extra challenge: the state now needs to
create programs and systems to enable their most vulnerable to adapt to the
added climatological challenges (to which the country has barely contributed),
while still helping the poorest communities overcome the long-standing socioeconomic vulnerabilities.

II. Guatemala’s Response to Climate Change
What should Guatemala’s fair and appropriate share of global efforts to
address climate change be, considering the country’s national circumstances
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with respect to: contributions to climate change; vulnerability to climate
impacts; capacity to adopt climate actions; and development needs? First, and
most important, due to high vulnerability of a substantial number of Guatemalans to the impacts of climate change, the country needs to channel its
domestic efforts primarily to climate adaptation. Second, because Guatemala
continues to contribute only marginally to global GhGs, especially on a per
capita basis, climate mitigation efforts should not be a priority, u
 nless they
have the co-benefits of improving development indicators that reduce the vulnerability of low-income Guatemalans. As Guatemala has low financial and
technological capacity, and high development needs, the country should have
access to international climate finance to support its priority adaptation efforts
and its mitigation efforts.
In practice, however, two obstacles are preventing Guatemala from treating
climate adaptation with the urgency that it deserves. The first obstacle is at the
national level, as the political will to make climate adaptation a genuine priority is ostensibly missing. The second is a structural obstacle at the international level, as international climate finance remains scarce, and existing
financial flows are biased toward investments in climate mitigation over
climate adaptation.

Constructive Engagement
At first sight, Guatemala can be considered as among a group of countries
playing a constructive role in the international and national efforts to combat
climate change. Guatemala became part of the UNFCCC in 1992, and joined
the Kyoto Protocol in 1998. In 2012, Guatemala joined a group of other developing countries that are among “neither the poorest nor the richest,” to create
a new negotiating block in the UNFCCC—the Association of Independent
Latin American and Caribbean States (AILAC) (Roberts and Edwards 2012).
Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Peru, Honduras, Paraguay, and Panama are the
other members of AILAC, an alliance pushing for more progressive climate
action from all parties to the UNFCCC, albeit emphasizing the continuing
special responsibility of developed countries. Since then, AILAC countries have
been officially building the case for ambitious low-carbon development at the
national and international levels (Edwards et al. 2015).
At national level, right a fter joining the Kyoto Protocol, Guatemala has
begun to establish what would become an extensive national institutional and
legal framework to address climate change (Grantham Institute 2016). The
country charged the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources
(MARN) with the responsibility to develop national climate strategies,
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creating a special internal unit to address climate change under this Ministry
in 2001. In 2005 MARN created a “National Clean Development Mechanism Office” to structure Guatemala’s engagement with the Kyoto Protocol
mechanism to reduce emissions in developing countries. In 2008, MARN
adopted a National Climate Change Program to coordinate national,

regional, and local policies to address climate change. In 2009 the Government approved a Climate Change National Policy, setting the guidelines for
the creation of national strategies for climate mitigation and climate adaptation. In late 2013, the Guatemalan Congress adopted the Climate Change
Framework Law, “to regulate vulnerability reduction, obligatory adaptation
to the effects of climate change, and the mitigation of GhGs emissions” (Congreso de La Republica 2013).
In 2014, Guatemala’s National Council of Urban and Rural Development
approved the long-term national development plan “K’atun: Nuestra Guatemala 2032,” (República de Guatemala 2014) incorporating climate mitigation
and climate adaptation as priority areas in Guatemala’s sustainable development planning for the next decades. Guatemala is rightly proud of the institutional framework it has been able to create, pointing that they w
 ere the first
country in Central America—and one of the first in Latin America—to create a Framework Law to address climate change.4 Without undermining the
importance of t hese achievements, the question is w
 hether t hese institutional
frameworks reflect the right priorities for a country with the climate change
profile of Guatemala, and w
 hether they are being effectively implemented.

Inverted National Priorities
Parties to the 2015 Paris Agreement, which w
 ill guide global climate action
 nder the UNFCCC g oing forward, vowed to pursue three goals related to cliu
mate change. The first goal is to hold the global average temperature to well
below 2oC above preindustrial levels, and to strive to keep the temperature
increase to 1.5oC, by undertaking domestic mitigation measures. The second
goal relates to climate adaptation, with parties vowing to enhance adaptive
capacity, to strengthen resilience, and to reduce vulnerability to climate change
at the national level. For that end, countries agreed to assess climate change
impacts and vulnerabilities, and to formulate and implement national

4. This fact was emphasized by members of the Ministry of the Environment
(MARN) during interviews with relevant stakeholders undertaken by the Study Space
Guatemala that prompted this book.
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adaptation plans, including prioritized actions considering vulnerable communities, places, and ecosystems. The third goal is to make “finance flows consistent
with a pathway t owards low greenhouse emissions and climate-resilient development” (UNFCCC 2015).
In the lead up to the Paris Agreement, parties submitted their (Intended)
Nationally Determined Contributions—(I)NDCs. (I)NDCs are communications of each party’s self-determined efforts to meet the three global climate
change goals, guided by its perception of national circumstances. Guatemala
presented its (I)NDC in September 2015, with a preamble emphasizing the
high vulnerability of Guatemala and the need for international support for
the country to properly address climate mitigation and adaptation. In the substantive part of the (I)NDC, Guatemala pledges an unconditional mitigation
target (relying on national financial resources) of reducing GhGs emissions
by 11.2 percent below Business as Usual (BAU) scenarios by year 2030, compared to base year 2005.5 Guatemala also pledges to further reduce its emissions by 11.4 percent below BAU, conditional on external support. Guatemala’s
mitigation pledge is adequate, if not overly ambitious, considering its natural
circumstances. The mitigation pledge is reasonably detailed, including sectoral
targets and existing and planned institutional frameworks to achieve the
mitigation goals. Guatemala’s 2015 Paris commitments to reduce emissions
are a continuation of the country’s long-term attention to climate mitigation
efforts, despite its low share of global GhGs contributions.
With national resources and international financial support, Guatemala has
been actively pursuing climate mitigation initiatives since the 1990s, having
created an institutional infrastructure to promote investments in emissions
reduction projects, and to establish the requisite legal and technical conditions
to attract external investments to mitigation activities in the country (Lokey
2012). Guatemala has undertaken four national inventories of GhGs emissions
in 1990, 1994, 2000, and 2005, following IPCC guidelines. In 2003, the government approved a law to create tax, economic, and administrative incentives to promote renewable energy in Guatemala.6 The objective was not only
to expand energy supply to Guatemalans, to reduce the dependence on import
of fossil fuels and to reduce GhGs emissions in the energy sector, but also to
5. When it comes to mitigation, developed countries (required under the UNFCCC
to take the lead in climate action) have all pledged some level of economy-w ide, absolute
emissions reductions targets. Most developing countries, on the other hand, have pledged
reductions in emissions intensity, or reductions relative to BAU scenarios.
6. República de Guatemala, Ley de Incentivos para el Desarrollo de Energias Renovables
(2003).
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establish Guatemala as an exporter of renewable energy to Mexico and to the
rest of Central America (UNDP 2015/2016). In 2005, the government created
the National Clean Development Mechanism Office, to develop policies related
to Guatemala’s participation in the UNFCCC Clean Development Mechanism
for emissions reductions (Grantham Institute 2016). In 2012, the government
established a Plan to Expand Energy Generation (2012–2026), with the goal
to increase the share of renewable energy—especially hydro and geothermal—
to around 80 percent by 2026 (Grantham Research Institute 2016).
Guatemala has also created a comprehensive institutional framework to formulate and to manage the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation (REDD+) and the reduction of emissions from other land uses.
Together, emissions from land use, including from deforestation and forest
degradation, comprise the largest share of current emissions in the country
(USAID 2015). Some of the investments in climate mitigation described above
have already generated positive results. Guatemala has attracted a considerable number of clean development mechanisms mitigation projects (twenty as
of August 2017) for a country of its size (UNEP 2017). Following the adoption
of the 2012 Energy Policy, a large number of renewables projects have been
developed, including the inauguration of one of the largest solar plants in Central America in May 2014 (the Sibo solar PV plant in the east of the country).
Guatemala has also invested and attracted climate finance investments for
the expansion of its hydropower capacity. As some of the hydropower proj
ects have followed a model of implementation without appropriate social and
environmental safeguards, this type of renewable energy project has led to
instances of social resistance and violent conflicts similar to processes in other
economic sectors such as mining (Carbon Market Watch 2015). The concern
is that some of t hese mitigation projects may end up displacing already vulnerable communities from their lands without proper compensation, or disrupting their fragile socioeconomic structures, aggravating the climate
adaptation challenges for these communities. The existence of social conflicts
associated with climate mitigation projects in Guatemala reflects the fact that
the country’s attention to climate adaptation and to t hose vulnerable to climate impacts has so far paled in comparison with the country’s active role in
climate mitigation.
To be true, Guatemala’s climate change laws and policies all mention adaptation as a main concern. The planning and implementation of adaptation
action, however, have lagged significantly b
 ehind mitigation. In the 1990s there
were no programs specifically related to climate impacts in Guatemala. In
2001, Guatemala’s First National Communication to the UNFCCC identified
a list of national priorities for adaptation (health, w
 ater management, forest

Chapter 8 · When Climate Adaptation Is Imperative

143

resources, food security) based on national initial assessments.7 Yet, when it
comes to elaborating on priority actions, the First National Communication
focused exclusively on mitigation strategies, without developing any detailed
adaptation plan (Keller et al. 2011). Eight years later, the 2009 National Climate Change Policy included vulnerability reduction and promotion of adaptation as main objectives, alongside climate adaptation. After listing the key
sectors generating adaptation concerns, the policy document failed to indicate any specific action or priorities. Adaptation projects in Guatemala have
remained ad hoc, in the absence of a comprehensive national adaptation
strategy.
The year 2010 was a harsh year for Guatemala, with several tropical storms
causing floods that led to fatalities and widespread displacements, besides huge
economic costs. Almost one decade after Guatemala’s special climate change
unit u
 nder MARN, and sufficient knowledge of the increased risk of flooding
related to tropical storms, the country had undertaken few structural mea
sures at the operational level to prevent the consequences (Bosque 2011). A
UN study showed that:
[i]n particular, t here have not been sufficient infrastructural projects
for flood mitigation such as the construction of levees and the dredging of rivers. Moreover, many of the projects completed to date do
not rely on appropriate technical studies that take climate change and
variability into account. In some instances, the result is that some
projects end up exacerbating problems downstream as well as creating a false sense of security. (Bosque 2011)
This showed the gap between the adoption of legal and policy institutional
frameworks, and actual action to address climate change. It also indicated how
in practice Guatemala continued to emphasize climate mitigation, which tends
to attract more private co-f unding and opportunities to generate financial
returns, than climate adaptation, which tend to benefit a large number of low-
income Guatemalans.
Only in 2013 the Framework Climate Change Law (Ley Marco)8 would dedicate a whole chapter to adaptation. Ley Marco mandated that MARN and

7. República de Guatemala, Primera Comunicacion Nacional sobre Cambio Climático
(2001).
8. Congreso de la República de Guatemala, Ley Marco para Regular la Reducción de
la Vulnerabilidad, la Adaptación Obligatoria ante los Efectos del Cambio Climatico y la
Mitigación de Gases de Efect Invernadero (2013).
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other governmental agencies develop strategic plans and guidelines to promote
adaptation and to manage risks related to climate change. Ley Marco also created a national climate change fund to finance projects that address risk
management, adaptation, and/or mitigation. The Fund clearly earmarks
80 percent of the resources to risk reduction and vulnerability management
and adaptation. This has been an important institutional safeguard. Notwithstanding, in practice there continues to be significantly fewer advances in
climate adaptation than in climate mitigation in Guatemala in the four years
since Ley Marco. Guatemala’s 2015 (I)NDC is markedly more imprecise in how
the country w
 ill address climate adaptation, as compared to climate mitigation (República de Guatemala 2015b). The Paris pledge indicates that the
country proposes to address climate adaptation in a transversal way in a list
of key sectors. The (I)NDC recognizes that Guatemala was still in the process
to develop a national system of climate impacts information, a system of early
alerts of natural disasters, and methodological guides for risk management,
reduction of vulnerability, and resilience enhancement (República de Guatemala 2015b).
In its 2016 Second Communication to the UNFCCC (República de Guatemala 2016), the gap between Guatemala’s achievements in climate mitigation
compared to climate adaptation so far was also discernible. The chapter on
adaptation reported some important recent advances in terms of completing
assessments of climate vulnerabilities in key sectors. Yet it basically described
a series of “orientations to the design of adaptation measures in Guatemala.”
The adaptation chapter sets guidelines that are more detailed than in previous
documents, and clearly communicate the right intentions. It fails, however,
to set explicit targets or measurable goals, or to indicate when Guatemala w
 ill
complete a first comprehensive national plan on adaptation. Recently a wide
range of funders and implementers, from the United Nations Development
Program and the World Bank, to bilateral aid agencies and local nongovernmental organizations, have partnered with the government to develop a series
of adaptation projects (UNDP 2017). T
 hese projects, primarily in the w
 ater
and agricultural sector, and in coastal zone management and disaster reduction to a lesser extent, remain ad hoc in the absence of a comprehensive national
climate adaptation plan in Guatemala.
In contrast, Guatemala’s Second National Communication to the UNFCCC
includes a chapter on mitigation that describes the creation of concrete initiatives and sets quantifiable goals, while reporting on tangible achievements
under “climate mitigation efforts undertaken in Guatemala.” Although there
have been some improvements in the last few years, Guatemala is still not
treating climate adaptation with the impetus that it deserves, considering its

Chapter 8 · When Climate Adaptation Is Imperative

145

climate change profile. Guatemala’s choice of priorities is understandable,
albeit not justifiable, b
 ecause climate adaptation initiatives do not offer significant economic opportunities for Guatemalan and international elites—
unlike, for example, large energy production projects. The government of
Guatemala needs to make the political decision to prioritize adaptation, and
to find the opportunities to create programs that generate the largest co-
benefits, in the absence of clear short term economic incentives. Guatemala also
must create the conditions to tap into international climate funds, as Guatemala should not shoulder the costs of addressing a problem that it has contri
buted little to create. Yet Guatemala’s experience can also be explained, at least
in part, by the perverse structural incentives that the global climate regime has
created, which channels existing scarce climate finance t oward mitigation action
rather than adaptation.

III. The International Structural Challenge
If Guatemala overcomes the domestic political challenge of getting the priorities right, the country still faces an international structural obstacle in the
UNFCCC regime—to access sufficient international funds to finance a large-
scale national adaptation program. Lack of adequate climate finance from
developed countries to cover the costs of climate action in developing countries has consistently been a point of contention in the global climate regime
(Rajamani 2016). A second point of contention is that most international
climate finance so far has flowed t oward climate mitigation, and a very small
share has been invested in climate adaptation. Studies show a split between
financial flows to climate mitigation and adaptation until the late 2000s of 95:5
(Buchner et al. 2015).
The mitigation bias in climate finance is well recognized. The dominance
of mitigation finance is explained as follows (Abadie et al. 2013): (a) mitigation
projects offer better perspective to attract cofinance from the private sector
than adaptation projects; (b) developed country donors act based on national
interest and they have more interest in contributing to reduction in global
emissions that affect them, rather than supporting adaptation activities that
will have only local or national effects in recipient countries; (c) climate mitigation projects have ancillary benefits, for example, the energy security benefits for substituting fossil fuels for renewables energy; etc. Since 2009, pressure
by developing countries and concerned stakeholders in developed countries,
civil society, and academic circles led the parties of the UNFCCC to begin
addressing the problem of mitigation bias in climate finance.

146

Chapter 8 · When Climate Adaptation Is Imperative

At the 2009 climate summit in Copenhagen, when the group of advanced
economies promised to mobilize $100 billion per year in climate finance for
developing countries by 2020, they vowed to balance the flows between both
mitigation and adaptation. This was a first step in both raising the available
climate finance in general, and in securing climate finance for adaptation more
specifically. Nevertheless, there was nothing to indicate that this balance would
mean anything close to 50/50. An OECD report estimates that 77 percent of
the 2014 tracked climate finance continued to be allocated t oward climate
change mitigation objectives, with only 16 percent toward climate change
adaptation (less than $10 billion) and 7 percent to activities that target both
climate objectives (OECD 2015). In the Paris Agreement, parties failed to agree
on a clear quantified share of climate finance to climate adaptation (Rajamani
2016). There is still a tall challenge facing developing countries that need to
tap into international climate finance for adaptation.
This challenge was recently illustrated by a 2016 UNEP Report entitled “the
Adaptation Finance Gap,” which assessed the difference between the projected
costs of adaptation measures to meet the collective adaptation needs, and projected financial flows to cover t hese costs (UNEP 2016). First, the UNEP Report
concludes that the actual costs of adaptation are likely significantly higher
than current projections. In fact, the Report estimates that costs are likely to be
two to three times higher than what is currently estimated for the period 2010
to 2030, and four to five times higher than current estimates for the period
2010 to 2050. For example, costs for adaptation in developing countries are
now projected to be US$70 billion to US$100 billion a year by 2050, while the
actual costs under UNEP estimates could reach US$280 billion to US$500 billion a year for that period. Even if parties to the UNFCCC w
 ere to fulfill their
pledges to mobilize the $100 billion a year to climate finance, and to dedicate
a balanced share of this amount to adaptation finance from 2020 to 2025, it
would likely not cover current estimates, let alone the new projected estimates
by UNEP. The Report presents only an indicative range of costs, based on
assessment of literature, as t here is no central system to estimate global costs of
adaptation. As adaptation costs are increasing, and as they tend to be underestimated, there is a strong possibility that the adaptation finance gap is even
higher than the UNEP projections.
With the clear scarcity of funds for adaptation, t here are important ongoing debates on how to mobilize additional funds. In principle, all adaptation
needs identified in developing countries should eventually receive financial
support if requested. The Adaptation Finance Gap Report, however, leads to
the inevitable conclusion that even if the total target of the financial pledge
is achieved, and adaptation finance reaches US$50 billion a year, it would
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not be enough to cover the conservative projections of adaptation costs in
developing countries. That means that Guatemala would have to compete
with many other developing countries for scarce climate adaptation finance.
The UNFCCC rightly gives priority for least developed countries and small
island developing states when it comes to accessing international climate
finance for adaptation. This is reflected in statistics that show that, regionally, adaptation finance has primarily been directed to Sub-Saharan Africa
(where most of least developed countries are) and Asia and the Pacific (where
t here are both least developed countries and small island states). The allocation of adaptation finance to Latin America and the Caribbean comes in
a distant third (Caravani et al. 2013).
The efforts to raise more funds for climate adaptation w
 ill continue,
although it is expected that it w
 ill take a long time to overcome the bias for
climate mitigation, if it is ever accomplished. The message is that only t hose
developing countries able to build a strong case for their need to tap international climate funds for adaptation w ill be able to break the ceiling. Investing in comprehensive assessments of adaptation needs, priority groups, and
economic sectors, and designing national adaptation plans w ill likely make a
difference. Chile, despite being a high-income developing country, has been
able to tap into adaptation funds b
 ecause it has prepared well-elaborated
plans that identify the most vulnerable groups and geographic areas in the
country.

IV. Conclusion
Guatemala is highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, and contributes
very l ittle to causing the problem of global warming. Guatemala should invest
primarily in adaptation, and in mitigation only when it brings clear co-benefits
for sustainable development in the country, and does not make citizens more
vulnerable. To be clear, this is not to say that countries such as Guatemala
should be oblivious to their emissions growth, however, insignificant in global
terms. Neither to say that developing countries with relatively low emissions
should continue to invest in carbon intensive growth strategies. The world
needs drastic emissions reductions, and the collective pledges are still not sufficient. All efforts on climate mitigation are needed. Yet these reductions
should come first and foremost from developed countries, and second from
emerging economies like China, India, and Brazil, with significant and growing emissions, or from high-income developing countries like Chile, with high
emissions per capita. Emerging economies and high middle income developing
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countries have much greater financial and technological capacity to reduce
their emissions in the short run.
The point is to emphasize that Guatemala should not prioritize ambitious
mitigation, especially using its own resources. The country should rely on the
financial and technological support of developed countries to reduce its emissions contributions.
And most important, highly vulnerable countries with low emissions and
limited capabilities, such as Guatemala, should not emphasize mitigation in
detriment of the imperative priority of investing their own resources, and to
tap into international finance, for climate adaptation. There is a need for stronger commitment from the government of Guatemala to prioritize adaptation, and to make sure that support reaches those vulnerable groups that need
it most.
Guatemala should also continue to actively advocate, as part of AILAC, for
improvements in the global climate regime to: (a) raise more international climate finance, from both developed countries but also from emerging economies that have growing financial capacity and large GhGs contributions and
(b) overcome the bias for climate mitigation by establishing minimum goals
for the allocation of funds for climate adaptation, or informal guidelines that
encourage financial institutions to channel more resources to adaptation. This
is clearly a tall endeavor for a country such as Guatemala, already facing many
other developmental challenges. However, Guatemala has already created a
strong l egal and institutional framework that can help in this quest, and despite
the many limitations, the global regime is slowly moving toward greater attention to the adaptation needs of developing countries such as Guatemala.
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